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Abstract
In recent years, outbreaks caused by multi-host pathogens (MHP) have posed a serious challenge to public and
animal health authorities. The frequent implication of wildlife in such disease systems and a lack of guidelines for
mitigating these diseases within wild animal populations partially explain why the outbreaks are particularly
challenging. To face these challenges, the French Ministry of Agriculture launched a multi-disciplinary group of
experts that set out to discuss the main wildlife specific concepts in the management of MHP disease outbreaks
and how to integrate wildlife in the disease management process.
This position paper structures the primary specific concepts of wildlife disease management, as identified by the
working group. It is designed to lay out these concepts for a wide audience of public and/or animal health officers
who are not necessarily familiar with wildlife diseases. The group’s discussions generated a possible roadmap for
the management of MHP diseases. This roadmap is presented as a cycle for which the main successive step are:
step 1-descriptive studies and monitoring; step 2-risk assessment; step 3-management goals; step 4-management
actions and step 5-assessment of the management plan. In order to help choose the most adapted management
actions for all involved epidemiological units, we integrated a decision-making framework (presented as a
spreadsheet). This tool and the corresponding guidelines for disease management are designed to be used by
public and health authorities when facing MHP disease outbreaks. These proposals are meant as an initial step
towards a harmonized transboundary outbreak response framework that integrates current scientific understanding
adapted to practical intervention.
Keywords: Emerging infectious diseases, Zoonosis, Proportionate management, Risk assessment, Europe,
Coordination, Decision-making framework, Wildlife, Integrated management, Policy making
Background
Diseases caused by multi-host pathogens (MHP) that
affect at least one free-living wild animal species may
deeply challenge veterinary services in their missions to
manage threats for human health, the animal trade
economy and biodiversity conservation [1]. In Europe,
outbreaks of animal tuberculosis (TB), African swine
fever (ASF), or rabies illustrate the difficulty of maintain-
ing an international status of freedom when a pathogen
that can be transmitted to humans or livestock circulates
in a wild animal population [1]. TB eradication in
livestock is notoriously challenging in the presence of
wild maintenance hosts such as badgers (UK), wild boars
(Spain) or [2] white-tailed deer (USA) [3].
Wildlife is recognized as a source of many emerging in-
fectious diseases (EIDs) in humans as well as in livestock
[4–6]. This emergence largely results from increased inter-
actions between humans, livestock and wildlife [7, 8].
Thus, in addition to the wildlife health challenges that
Europe has been facing for several decades (rabies, TB…),
emerging infectious events implicating wildlife have be-
come another major preoccupation for animal health au-
thorities. Examples of particular concerns include ASF,
chronic wasting disease and West Nile virus infection.
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Successful attempts at eradicating or severely reducing
the occurrence of a disease implicating wildlife were
achieved only when management plans were imple-
mented specifically for wildlife, as was the case with the
massive vaccination campaign against fox rabies in
Western Europe. However, while accepted operating
procedures are often available for human and livestock
disease control, they are uncommon for wildlife, which
is largely related to the difficulties associated with the
health assessment of, and disease control in, wildlife
populations. Current advances in ecological understand-
ing along with improvements in disease surveillance and
control tools mean that we are more likely to be success-
ful at detecting and controlling disease outbreaks. This
in turn makes it a good time to consider a common ap-
proach to better integrate wildlife in the control of dis-
eases caused by MHPs. The European Union (EU) has
endorsed this necessity: the new Regulation on transmis-
sible animal diseases [9] states that “Special rules should
[…] be laid down, where necessary, for measures to con-
trol and eradicate diseases in wild animals”.
To efficiently tackle diseases implicating wildlife, pub-
lic health officers should initially be familiarized with the
specific concepts of disease management in wildlife. Fol-
lowing this suggestion and with the financial support of
the French Ministry of Agriculture, a group of European
experts gathered to prepare a state-of-the-art accounting
of the current methods and tools used to manage dis-
eases and infections that are notifiable to the World Or-
ganisation of Animal Health (OIE) when the involved
pathogens are harboured by wildlife. The members of
this working group were selected by the ASA
organization (Animal Société Aliment) to encompass a
range of professional expertise including game and wild-
life managers, veterinary pathologists, public and veter-
inary public health officers, microbiologists, ecologists,
and representatives of the French Ministries for Agricul-
ture and for Ecology. All of these experts are co-authors
of this paper.
This position paper structures the basic concepts of
wildlife disease management for a wide audience of pub-
lic and animal health officers who are not necessarily fa-
miliar with wildlife diseases. From the concepts
discussed in this article, a basis emerged for operational
guidelines which could be used by public and animal
health authorities when facing MHP disease outbreaks
(i.e., how to include wildlife?). These guidelines are
meant to ensure that the concepts of wildlife disease
management are not only respected but also integrated
into the wider process of managing MHP diseases. This
global process is illustrated as a roadmap for the man-
agement of MHP diseases, integrating a preliminary de-
cision-making framework for choosing management
actions across all susceptible populations. This proposal
is meant as an initial step towards a common global out-
break response process that integrates current scientific
understanding and is tailored for practical intervention.
The professional background of the experts is primar-
ily focused on European wildlife health. As a conse-
quence, although the concepts we develop are more
global, the operational tools we propose are largely
adapted to the European context.
Main text
Difficulties specific to the management of MHPs involving
wildlife
MHPs can affect three types of epidemiological units,
i.e., of vertebrate host populations [10, 11] as follows: (1)
humans (zoonotic diseases), (2) captive animals, i.e., ani-
mals under human supervision, whether wild or domes-
tic (such as domestic and zoo animals, farmed game or
exotic pets), and (3) wildlife, understood here as free-liv-
ing wild animal populations. The environment consti-
tutes a fourth unit that is relevant to management when
it enables pathogen persistence and/or transmission in-
dependently of a vertebrate host, as is the case for vec-
tor-borne diseases. From now on, we designate these
four epidemiological units as “units” for the purpose of
simplification. All four units can contribute to pathogen
transmission and have to be considered for an efficient
disease control effort.
For any population, the success of management ac-
tions relies on the ability to encompass a sufficient pro-
portion of individuals within a short time-frame to affect
the turnover of the infection (one-shot concept). This is
much more difficult to achieve for wildlife than for ani-
mals living under human supervision: free-living wild
animals are not restrained; their populations often can-
not be quantified with useful accuracy; they interact in
an uncontrollable manner with multiple other wild spe-
cies and with an unfenced environment; and they are
difficult to handle or even simply to approach on a short
distance. As a consequence, disease management actions
that may be successful in livestock cannot simply be
transposed to wildlife.
Management actions are more complex and take lon-
ger to be implemented for wildlife. As an example, a
vaccination plan on a wild species requires testing vac-
cines on that species (vaccines have usually been tested
only in domestic species), developing and testing an ad-
ministration form (for example oral baits) adequate for
the target species, both in the laboratory and in the
field), and ultimately planning a campaign of several
months or years to vaccinate a sufficient proportion of
the population. Such vaccination campaigns might also
expose non-target species (especially with oral baits) to
the vaccine, which can raise sanitary concerns for them
[12]. For captive animals, when a vaccine is available, it
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is often presented as an authorized injectable formula
which can be administered to all target animals within a
relatively short period of time.
Some disease management actions such as culling are
not as effective in wildlife as they have proven to be for
captive animals; these actions have even been shown to
be counter-productive in a number of situations [13].
For captive animals, a farm can be emptied of its stock
and sanitized before introducing new individuals several
weeks later. In the natural environment, total culling of
a wild species population is rarely possible, especially
within a short time-frame (a few weeks), and sanitation
of the environment is generally not possible.
The management of diseases in wildlife is not only
more complicated to implement, it is also subject to in-
creased uncertainty regarding its expected efficiency and
impacts because it is typically based on a lower level of
knowledge than for captive animals, notably on popula-
tion dynamics and host-pathogen interactions. Popula-
tion size and structure (demographics) are often difficult
to evaluate, although these are key parameters to evalu-
ating transmission rates and setting up efficient manage-
ment actions. The sanitary status of the animal
population and the nature of its interactions with the
pathogen (previous contacts between pathogen and
hosts) also influence on transmission scenarios and ul-
timately the success of management plans. Wild animal
populations may harbour a pathogen at a low prevalence
but contribute to maintaining it locally, as is the case for
classical swine fever (CSF) in wild boar (Sus scrofa) [14]
or TB in red deer (Cervus elaphus) [15]. Furthermore, in
such a scenario the detection of infections and the as-
sessment of pathogen prevalence within a spatial unit,
and the detection of trends over time – before, during
and after the implementation of management actions –
remain particularly challenging [16].
Due to the uncertainties associated with monitoring
and managing a disease in wildlife, the consequences of
management actions (beneficial or detrimental) are diffi-
cult to foresee and study. In the case of culling cam-
paigns, immigration of new individuals and dispersion of
infected individuals are difficult to predict and to pre-
vent. Epidemiological and ecological investigations have
to be planned carefully and conducted continuously to
reduce the level of uncertainty all along the course of
management actions.
In the event of a MHP disease outbreak, authorities
often face contradictory positions and demands from
stakeholders and lobbies. The complexity and diversity
of MHP disease systems inevitably result in varying per-
ceptions among them according to their own priorities.
Farmers and other professional bodies from the private
sector have sometimes been imposed extremely harsh
measures for disease control on their own livestock for
transboundary animal diseases (TADs), such as highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), TB, ASF and CSF,
with their on-farm detection resulting in total culling.
These stakeholders may consider wildlife as a threat and
call for more invasive management actions on this unit,
which are in fact not necessarily efficient, nor safe, and
sometimes not even possible for reasons discussed
above. Furthermore, many wildlife species are protected
(or/and emblematic), and disease management opera-
tions on these species may be illegal or at least meet the
opposition of other interest groups, the general public,
environmental NGO’s etc., as it is the case for a brucel-
losis outbreak (Brucella melitensis) in Alpine ibex
(Capra ibex ibex) since 2012 [17].
In and of itself, the representation of wild animals may
generate significantly different perceptions among envir-
onmental NGO’s, hunters, farmers and the general pub-
lic - with several wildlife species being iconic for some
and pests for others. The drivers of these varying per-
ceptions depend not only on the hosts involved but also
on pathogen virulence as well as on socio-cultural, eco-
nomic and political factors. Such conflicts can also feed
on the uncertainties regarding the epidemiological roles
played by wildlife in such disease systems.
These specificities show that wildlife diseases cannot
be monitored and managed in the same way and within
the same time-frame as diseases of captive animals. This
implies that the design of disease management plans
should involve all of the disciplines relevant to each unit,
including wildlife specialists who are competent in tak-
ing into account the specificities of wildlife (wildlife dis-
eases, but also wildlife ecology and management, and
social sciences). Namely, the following professionals
should be included in the disease management process:
medical doctors and public health officers in case of zoo-
notic disease, veterinarians knowledgeable on the con-
cerned animal species, domestic and wild; ecologists
(e.g., experts in population dynamics and ethologists),
wildlife managers, and entomologists in the case of vec-
tor-borne diseases. Importantly, the role of wildlife man-
agers in efficiently implementing the measures that are
taken to limit an outbreak should be recognized and
communicated, both at the national and European levels.
Strategies should be developed according to a common
framework to enable a coordinated response that ac-
counts for all the relevant units and their specificities,
including their interactions with the pathogen and with
the other units.
In summary, to improve the outcome of managing
MHP systems implicating wildlife, it is essential to (1)
consider the wildlife unit for management actions, (2)
take into account the specificities of the disease system
in the wildlife unit and of disease management in wild-
life and (3) integrate the management of the wildlife unit
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within the process of the wider management plan (inte-
grating all other susceptible units).
How to integrate wildlife specificities in the management
of multi-host diseases: a logical process for decision
making, adaptable to all situations
In the case of OIE notifiable diseases occurring in cap-
tive animals or humans, contingency plans often exist at
national levels. These are powerful tools: they are de-
signed in advance, schedule pre-defined actions to miti-
gate the disease and allow a swift official response to an
outbreak. Whenever possible, we suggest such contin-
gency plans to additionally include guidelines for patho-
gen control in wildlife if existing data suggest that
wildlife may play an important role in the epidemiology
of these diseases.
Such contingency plans are only possible to implement
when the danger is identified and predictable. For all
other MHP events, instead of pre-defined management
actions, we suggest a common process for selecting,
implementing and monitoring these actions. We propose
a roadmap that consists in a succession of logical and
transparent steps to cover the management process from
the outbreak detection to the end of the disease manage-
ment actions.
Preparing this roadmap during “peace” times should
allow reaching a consensus among all stakeholders, at a
time when there is still room for discussion and before
emotions overshadow rational argumentation. Such a
roadmap would not only contribute to reducing conflict
risks, it would also enable quicker responses to disease
events (reduced time spent agreeing on the process).
Based on the concepts presented here and in the fol-
lowing paragraphs, Fig. 1 shows how the roadmap for
MHP disease management could be constructed. An an-
imated version of this figure, illustrating the dynamics of
this roadmap, can be found as Additional file 1.
Step 1. Monitoring the disease/pathogen and the hosts/
environment
Following the discovery of a disease outbreak, priority
must be conferred to descriptive studies and disease/
pathogen monitoring, which should be both initiated as
early as possible. It is the step 1 of our roadmap (Fig. 1).
By improving the quality and quantity of available data
(on the disease/pathogen, the host-pathogen interactions,
the host populations and the pathogen/environment
Fig. 1 Management cycle for diseases implicating wildlife. Legend: Figure illustrating the roadmap designed for the management of diseases
implicating wildlife. Step 1 -Descriptive studies and monitoring- is considered as ongoing for the whole duration of the outbreak (outer circle on
the figure). Then the roadmap is constructed on 4 consecutive steps: (2) Risk assessment, (3) Management goals, (4) Management actions and (5)
Assessment which are to be repeated as long as the outbreak persists (inner circle)
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interactions), descriptive studies improve the outcome of
decisions that will be made regarding disease manage-
ment. Descriptive studies should aim at defining the epi-
demiological role of each affected species and helping
selecting the units relevant to disease management [18].
In case of a disease outbreak, monitoring also enables
public health officers to adapt the disease management
plan to any evolution of the epidemiological situation in
a timely manner (i.e., adaptive management). For this
purpose, monitoring should provide sufficient spatial
resolution to “allow changes in disease occurrence to be
identified and the impact of any intervention to be crit-
ically assessed” [18].
Besides disease/pathogen monitoring, monitoring of
the host population(s) (population ecology and dynam-
ics) and the interactions between the pathogen and the
environment is essential to assess the potential eco-
logical impacts of the management plan (impacts on the
concerned wild animal population but also on the eco-
system it belongs to).
Overall, monitoring activities after a disease outbreak
should include the collection of all possible data that can
be gained from the implemented disease and population
management activities, from the very beginning to the
end and even beyond the outbreak. In our opinion, en-
gaging in cost savings by minimizing data collection
within the framework of an outbreak can result in higher
costs if another event of the same type occurs again, as
the existing gaps in knowledge may affect the prediction
and mitigation plans for this new event.
Research has been progressing in fields that are rele-
vant to wildlife health and wildlife population monitor-
ing. Wildlife surveillance networks (event-based or
targeted surveillance) [19] and diagnostic tools (e.g.,
high-speed sequencing, nucleic acid microarray chips)
have improved and accelerated disease detection (thanks
to higher test sensitivity, the availability of rapid and
transportable tests, the collection of temperature-resist-
ant sample matrices, and improved communication
within and beyond national borders) and increased pos-
sibilities for field-testing, resulting in shorter delays be-
tween clinical suspicion and diagnostic confirmation.
These improvements may increase the number of de-
tected outbreaks and lead to a growing need for deci-
sions to be made by competent authorities. More
efficient early detection of diseases should also be associ-
ated with earlier management actions (when these are
needed) and, in turn, result in more efficient disease
control. The progress in statistical methods (e.g., for
geographical and temporal analyses) ensures that in-
creasing amounts of information are retrieved from dis-
ease events and improves the output of disease/pathogen
monitoring (e.g., hindcasting techniques using early out-
break data to predict the trajectory of an epidemic prior
to detection; [20]. Overall, there is a wide set of diagnos-
tic, statistical and modelling methods which are increas-
ingly performant and can be used to improve the quality
and quantity of knowledge on wildlife population and
disease/pathogen dynamics that can serve decision
making.
Step 2. Evaluating the risk
Disease outbreaks raise a question that is difficult to an-
swer: “is the sanitary risk acceptable for the exposed
population(s), and is action needed to lower the disease
risk to an acceptable level?” To answer this question,
risk assessment is necessary prior to choosing a course
of action. Risk assessment must be recognized as a com-
pulsory step prior to disease management because deci-
sion makers need to balance the perception of a need
for action with the actual current and future disease risk.
In the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, risk assess-
ment is defined as “the evaluation of the likelihood and
the biological and economic consequences of entry, estab-
lishment and spread of a hazard” [21]. This evaluation
corresponds to step 2 of our proposed roadmap (Fig. 1).
Risk assessment is based on the collective, independ-
ent and potentially contradictory deliberations of ex-
perts, selected in the absence of conflicts of interest and
based on their experience in the relevant fields of expert-
ise (including wildlife when this unit is concerned). It
aims to set qualitative or quantitative thresholds in
terms of pathogen circulation within each affected unit
by identifying a level of risk within this unit. That level
of risk (which can be qualified as negligible, minor, mod-
erate, high, or unknown) is estimated based on the
current knowledge on transmission routes, host and
pathogen ecology and contact structures. This risk as-
sessment should be performed as early as possible, and
it should take into consideration not only what is known
but also what is not known. Therefore, the process of
risk assessment also requires the characterization of
sources of uncertainty, (i.e., the lack of data on specific
elements of the outbreak), the expected inaccuracies
(e.g., the limited sensitivity and/or specificity of diagnos-
tic tests used for surveillance) and variations in the avail-
able data (e.g., natural biological variation). This is
particularly important in the case of wildlife because the
level of uncertainty is generally higher than for other
units. Choosing courses of action without taking into ac-
count the uncertainties can have deleterious effects.
Risk assessment is not supposed to define management
goals or suggest courses of action. It rather contributes to
define an acceptable risk level from which a global man-
agement goal can be defined and subsequent management
goals for each unit can be derived. However, while we do
believe that risk assessment is essential before invasive
measures (culling, vaccination, sterilisation) are envisaged,
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we consider that the emergency implementation of com-
mon sense measures to protect specific compartments or
limit the expansion of an outbreak (i.e., non-invasive, short-
term and consensual actions such as a reinforcement of
biosecurity or hunting bans) should not be postponed until
completion of risk assessment. Importantly, risk assessment
should include evaluating the potential negative conse-
quences of disease control measures.
Competent bodies exist to provide these assessments
at the national level (e.g., the French Agency for Food,
Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety
ANSES in France, the Federal Agency for the Safety of
the Food Chain AFSCA in Belgium, or the Bundesinsti-
tut für Risikobewertung BfR in Germany) and at the
European level (European Food Safety Agency, EFSA).
Risk assessment performed by these independent agen-
cies is a transparent process and yields clear results on
the risk level and on the level of (un) certainty it is based
upon. It is therefore essential to communicate the results
of the risk assessment (which includes information on
environmental issues linked to the origin and impact of
diseases, and on potential cascades of management con-
sequences such as a potential disequilibrium of the af-
fected ecosystem) to all stakeholders, such as farmers,
hunters, conservationists and other concerned land users
within the span of an outbreak.
All the scientific information used to evaluate the risk
should be presented and referenced in written reports
enabling science-based communication and constituting
a knowledge file for eventual management plans. A
complete file should include up-to-date information on
transmission routes, host and pathogen ecology, contact
structures and expected impacts (economical, ecological,
and sociological) of the disease.
Step 3. Determining the goals of disease management
Based on the results of the risk assessment, at first, an
overall management goal should be set for the complete
host-pathogen/disease system, which is step 3 of the
roadmap we propose (Fig. 1). Once this overall disease
management goal has been agreed upon, specific man-
agement goals have to be set for each epidemiological
unit.
Wobeser’s classification [22] of management goals is
generally used for the management of a transmissible
disease. These possible goals are: prevention, control,
eradication and “Laissez-faire” (do nothing). In the con-
text of multi-host disease management, these four cat-
egories must be considered both for the complete
disease system as well as for each single unit (appropri-
ate goals may differ among units).
(1) Prevention: this approach “includes all measures
designed to exclude or prevent the introduction of
a disease into an unaffected population”. Prevention
can be appropriate for an unaffected country or for
unaffected units (e.g., a pathogen circulating in
wildlife that is not yet affecting captive animals or
humans).
(2) Control: this strategy “applies to activities designed
to reduce the frequency of occurrence or the effects
of an existing disease within an individual animal or
a population to an acceptable or tolerable level, or
to contain the spatial spread of infection.” Control
implies the acceptance of a certain level of
pathogen persistence in one or more units.
Depending on the context, this approach can
correspond either to long-term continuous action
to limit or cap disease prevalence, or to short-term
measures prior to the implementation of an
eradication program.
(3) Eradication: this approach “involves the total
elimination of an existing disease.” Fifty years of
experience have shown that eradicating disease or
infection that implicates wildlife is a long-term
issue. In fact, efforts to eradicate diseases such as
TB, brucellosis or CSF are still ongoing in Europe.
When the eradication of MHP was achieved (which
remains an exception), this process took years, or in
some cases, even decades [23].
(4) “Laissez-faire” means to “refrain from harming”.
This approach can be compared to the adage
“primum non nocere” [first, do no harm] that guides
the medical professions towards a prudent and
proportionate response to curing a disease. Laissez-
faire remains a baseline scenario in terms of the
cost/efficiency relationship. Nevertheless, it requires
targeted surveillance and communication to the
exposed public, and such an approach is actually far
from doing nothing. This management approach
(rather than goal) must be considered (1) when
disease mitigation is considered necessary but
efficient management tools are not available/not
possible, and (2) when a risk/reward analysis shows
that it is the best choice. Disease outbreaks in
wildlife can indeed slow down and spontaneously
die out through self-regulation as was the case for
Brucella melitensis infections in Alpine ibex (Capra
ibex) in Gran Paradiso National park (Italy) [24].
Furthermore, it is possible that human intervention
may not be efficient [25] or may even be counter-
productive [26].
The choice of the general and specific management
goals is based on the expected impacts of the disease on
animals and humans, on the respective roles of each unit
in the epidemiology of the disease of concern, on the level
of circulation of the pathogen within and among the
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different units, and on the host/pathogen interactions.
The four management goals listed above are generic and
need to be more precisely defined in operational situa-
tions. Future efforts on the decision-making framework
we present in step 4 of our roadmap (Fig. 1) should ultim-
ately focus on setting numerical objectives (e.g., specific
incidence or prevalence to attain acceptable pathogen cir-
culation, deadline for the eradication of a pathogen, inci-
dence of a pathogen under which doing nothing is a valid
goal).
Step 4. Selecting effective and proportionate management
actions: a decision-making framework
We have developed a decision-making framework for
guiding competent authorities in their selection of man-
agement actions to achieve the general and unit-specific
management goals defined in step 3. This decision-making
framework is presented in Additional file 2 and its corre-
sponding user’s guide is presented in Additional file 3. It
aims at enabling managers to select the appropriate set of
actions through a logical process and from a comprehen-
sive checklist of possible procedures. In its current stage
of development, it is a concept model consisting in an
Excel® file comprising three worksheets. It is not a user
ready decision-making framework (possible improvements
of the model are presented in a dedicated paragraph).
To be effective, disease management actions have to
sufficiently contribute to breaking the epidemiological
links (direct and indirect) between the reservoir (i.e. the
infected unit/population(s), which maintain the patho-
gen and act as a source of infection for other units/
hosts) and the spill-over unit(s)/host(s) (i.e., the sensitive
population(s) exposed to the reservoir) [25, 27]. The pre-
vention, control or eradication of a disease implies an in-
tegrative used of all of the necessary management
actions, based on each particular epidemiological sce-
nario and its evolution.
Although additional aspects of MHP disease system
may also dictate the final choice of disease management
actions, the initial selection from the checklist of avail-
able actions will depend on the pathogen transmission
pathways (e.g., disease management actions aiming at af-
fecting pathogen survival in the environment are of little
interest for directly transmitted diseases). We therefore
chose to develop one worksheet per transmission path-
way, proposing a checklist of suitable actions per path-
way. Although there are only three main possible
pathways (direct, indirect and vector-borne), their pos-
sible combinations result in seven transmission scenar-
ios. To cover all the scenarios within three sheets, we
proceeded as follows: the “direct transmission” work-
sheet presents only management actions relevant for dir-
ect transmission; the “indirect transmission” worksheet
present management actions for both direct and indirect
transmission; and the “vector-borne transmission” work-
sheet presents management actions for vector-borne, in-
direct and direct transmission. A simplified version of
these worksheets is presented in Table 1.
Once the relevant sheet has been selected, each man-
agement action should be weighed against three factors
as follows: (1) feasibility, (2) cost, (3) efficiency.
Feasibility is the first question to address. Factors to take
into account are the availability of the action (e.g., is a vac-
cine available, and as an appropriate formula?) and the
capacity to attain operational objectives for this action
(e.g., can a vaccination campaign cover a sufficient pro-
portion of the population to prevent pathogen mainten-
ance?). Some management actions require specific
administrative authorisations which can delay or condition
their implementation and render them unavailable as
short-term actions (culling of protected species).
Cost comes as a second question. It is not only about
material costs (financial costs including manpower) but
also about the ecological “costs” or negative impacts on
ecosystem health (e.g., what would be the impact on
non-target species ingesting vaccinal baits?).
Expected efficiency is the third and final question to an-
swer (e.g., can vaccination efficiently reduce the occurrence
of a disease/pathogen to attain eradication within the unit?).
The expected efficiency is conditioned by the type of action,
by the host/pathogen interactions, by the host ecology and
perhaps even more factors. It is important to remember
that single actions may be inefficient and that it is often ne-
cessary to consider combining several measures.
The aim of this procedure is to build a disease manage-
ment plan that includes both efficient and proportionate
responses. The notion of proportionate management im-
plies that the measures taken to manage a disease out-
break are not more costly than absolutely needed to
decrease the pathogen circulation to an acceptable level
(i.e., the impact of the action to be undertaken should not
overreach its efficiency). Factors to consider when aiming
at proportionate management include the expected effi-
cacy of the measures for the target species, the social ac-
ceptability and feasibility of the measures, and the
ecological cascade of expected consequences. The term
“acceptable” refers to a risk assessment that accounts for
all stakeholder points of view, which implies that compro-
mises will be made because these points of views may be
contradictory. The “proportionate response” notion is
present in the EU Animal Health Regulation (Article 82),
but its local implementation relies on the local authorities
that face a disease outbreak.
The decision-making framework we present in this
article is a preliminary attempt to integrate scientific
knowledge on disease epidemiology, monitoring and
control and on population dynamics into a simplified
but complete and rational table. An improved version of
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this decision-making framework could be used by the
competent authorities to select management actions for
each of the affected units, by following the integrative
approach promoted by the “One Health” concept. The
output of this decision-making framework is quite
straightforward and simple and can be used as a basis
for presenting potential disease management measures
to decision makers.
The first operational experiences with this decision-
making framework are likely to reveal which improve-
ments are needed. For the logical process that consists
of a succession of conditional functions, the initial
spreadsheet could be presented as a software that inte-
grates more information for each step in the future. As
an example, the SANTERO (risk-based Surveillance for
ANimal HealTh in EuROpe) consortium developed a
web tool serving as a surveillance design framework and
another web tool to help designing the assessment
methods for the chosen surveillance design [28].
Although it is important that such a tool is easy to use
and that it presents simple, straightforward results, a
certain level of complexity is inevitable, because it deals
with MHP diseases, which are the most complex disease
systems and are accordingly difficult to study, monitor
and manage. Passing from a spreadsheet format to a web
tool or software would enable its simplified use (i.e., by
only displaying necessary fields) and broaden its possibil-
ities, such as subdividing the units if several species are
susceptible. Although the format of the decision-making
framework could certainly be improved and more possi-
bilities considered, we believe that the basic principles
and parameters that have been used to prepare the
current framework will continue to apply to future
models.
The use of an agreed-upon decision-making frame-
work should limit the potential for conflicts and ensure
a multi-disciplinary approach enabling full transparency
among disciplines and stakeholders. Furthermore, the
Table 1 Simplified version of the decision making framework
Units Feasibility Cost Efficiency Action to be considered for management plan
Humans Choose management goal for this unit: Prevention, Control, Eradication or Laissez-faire
Action 1 Availability? Economical? Efficient alone? Yes or No?
Possibility? Social? Efficient combined with other options?
Capacity? Environmental? Inefficient?
…… … … … …
Action x … … … …
Captive animals Choose a management goal for this unit: Prevention, Control, Eradication or Laissez-faire
Action 1 Availability? Economical? Efficient alone? Yes or No?
Possibility? Social? Efficient combined with other options?
Capacity? Environmental? Inefficient?
...… … … … …
Action x … … … …
Environment Choose a management goal for this unit: Prevention, Control, Eradication or Laissez-faire
Action 1 Availability? Economical? Efficient alone? Yes or No?
Possibility? Social? Efficient combined with other options?
Capacity? Environmental? Inefficient?
...... … … … …
Action x … … … …
Wildlife Choose a management goal for this unit: Prevention, Control, Eradication or Laissez-faire
Action 1 Availability? Economical? Efficient alone? Yes or No?
Possibility? Social? Efficient combined with other options?
Capacity? Environmental? Inefficient?
… .. … … … …
Action x … … … …
This simplified table illustrates how the process of choosing the relevant management actions should be followed. This table is a simplified version of one
worksheet which corresponds to one type of disease transmission. For each relevant unit (humans, captive animals, environment and wildlife), each listed
management action should be weighed against the following factors: feasibility, cost and efficiency for the pre-established management goal (eradication of the
disease, control of the disease, prevention of the disease or laissez-faire). Following this process should leave the manager with a list of one or more management
actions for each unit, which match the 3 criteria and should be considered for implementation
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decision-making framework as we designed it requests
that the manager address the three crucial questions of
disease management (feasibility, cost and efficiency). This
approach also sets the criteria used to assess the efficiency
of the management measures after their implementation.
None of the information and data available on a dis-
ease system can be directly transposed from the study
results into the decision-making framework. It is also
not possible for the results of the framework to be dir-
ectly applied in the field. This tool remains a technical
support to prioritize disease management actions but it
is not sufficient to deliver a final management plan to
public and animal health authorities. The output of this
tool is, and should remain, open to interpretation by
properly trained and competent personnel. This restric-
tion highlights once more the importance of a transdis-
ciplinary collaboration because the use of the tool
requires competencies in human and animal health,
ecology and wildlife management.
Step 5. Regularly assessing the disease management plan:
dynamic management
The process we present for choosing disease manage-
ment actions only allows designing an efficient and pro-
portionate management plan in response to the initial
situation. Management actions aim at engendering
changes in the initial epidemiological situation and the
roles played by the affected units. These actions can be
fully or partially efficient, non-efficient or even counter-
productive; they can also have lower or higher negative
impacts than expected. Therefore, it is essential for a
management plan to be adaptable according to the oc-
curring disease system’s changes (dynamic manage-
ment). It implies that the management plan includes the
potential downgrading of the actions in case of a
favourable situation, as well as exit strategies in case of a
failure in the first set of measures. This highlights the
importance of continuous disease/pathogen and popula-
tion monitoring (as recommended in step 1 of the road-
map) to identify these changes, and ultimately it means
that both management plan (step 4) and monitoring
plan (step 1) loop back, at a pre-established deadline, to
risk assessment (step 2), which is then performed on a
wider base of knowledge (on the pathogen, the hosts,
their interactions and their reactions to management ac-
tions) and maybe the availability of new control tech-
niques, and finally integrates an assessment of the initial
management and monitoring plans.
Theoretical ecological models continually improve our
basic understanding of the impacts of ecological factors
on the efficacy of disease/pathogen surveillance [29] and
on wildlife population control [30]. In turn, the higher
resolution of pathogen monitoring and growing know-
ledge of wildlife ecology and population dynamics can
be used to improve the predictive power of operational
models for specific disease systems. These models enable
us to simulate and develop disease control strategies and
policy before an outbreak occurs or during an outbreak,
representing a valuable tool for dynamic management.
These advances in ecological understanding and control
strategy development offer increased support to decision
makers. For example, in recent events such as the detec-
tion of brucellosis in Alpine ibex in the French Alps and
the emergence of ASF in wild boar in Eastern Europe,
both the ANSES and EFSA included predictive models in
their assessments [31, 32] within reasonable delays follow-
ing disease detection. These modelling possibilities should
be more systematically explored when management ac-
tions are planned for wildlife, to test the expected effi-
ciency and impacts of different management options.
Towards harmonized transboundary disease management
The five-step process we propose was built upon the
successes and failures of wildlife health management in
past decades. It offers a rational support for disease
management decisions and may promote harmonized
procedures in Europe. Indeed, disease surveillance in
wild animal populations is often not straightforward,
and surveillance networks are not evenly developed
across Europe [19]. Wild animals can move freely and
unchecked across borders and can sometimes even mi-
grate over long distances. Pathogens that circulate within
wild animal populations are therefore more difficult to
record than those that circulate in captive animal popu-
lations [33]. The responsibility for disease surveillance
and management does not rely on a single European
country or EU member state [34]. The efficient manage-
ment of transboundary multi-host diseases cannot be
achieved without a global and coordinated response,
which should be based on a common decision frame.
Management plans should cover the whole span of a dis-
ease system, regardless of state frontiers, and with the same
methods and means applied on the whole area. For the EU
more specifically, this coordination is all the more feasible
because of a common concept of animal health and the ex-
istence of a common regulatory frame, as embodied by the
recent update of the Animal Health Regulation.
Conclusions
Wildlife health management is complex and has its own
specificities that differentiate it from captive animal
health management and more generally from public
health. In the last 50 years, public and animal health au-
thorities have treated sanitary threats from wildlife on a
case-by-case basis. However, the recently adopted EU
Animal Health Law creates a need for guidelines to
achieve proportionate responses to disease outbreaks
that include a wildlife host. The significant improvement
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of tools for diagnostics and data management provides
an appropriate basis for moving forward. We propose to
follow a systematized five-step process or roadmap as a way
to recognize the specificities of wildlife and to integrate
them into a wider approach (One Health). This process en-
compasses disease/pathogen and host population monitor-
ing, disease risk assessment, setting unit-specific disease
management goals, using a decision-making framework,
and implementing dynamic management, with all of these
steps to be systematically carried out.
Additional files
Additional file 1: The management cycle for diseases implicating
wildlife in a dynamic view. This video clip illustrates how the roadmap
designed for the management of diseases implicating wildlife is to be
used in a dynamic view. Step 1 -Descriptive studies and monitoring- is
considered as ongoing for the whole duration of the outbreak (outer
circle on the figure). Then the roadmap is constructed on 4 consecutive
steps: (2) Risk assessment, (3) Management goals, (4) Management
actions and (5) Assessment which are to be repeated as long as the
outbreak persists (inner circle). (MP4 7438 kb)
Additional file 2: The decision-making framework. The decision-making
framework is designed for the selection of management actions to
achieve the general and unit-specific management goals. This framework
is a spreadsheet consisting of five sheets. The first sheet is a general
presentation which presents how the framework operates and invites the
user to select the appropriate transmission pathways for the chosen
diseases. To cover all the transmission scenarios, three sheets are then
proposed: the “direct transmission” worksheet presents only
management actions relevant for direct transmission; the “indirect
transmission” worksheet present management actions for both direct and
indirect transmission; and the “vector-borne transmission” worksheet
presents management actions for vector-borne, indirect and direct
transmission. For each relevant unit (humans, captive animals,
environment and wildlife), each listed management action should be
weighed against the following factors: feasibility, cost and efficiency for
the pre-established management goal (eradication of the disease, control
of the disease, prevention of the disease or laissez-faire). Following this
process should leave the manager with a list of one or more
management actions for each unit, which match the 3 criteria and
should be considered for implementation. (XLS 148 kb)
Additional file 3: A user’s guide to the decision making framework. This
document proposes a step-by-step user’s guide for operating the
decision making framework presented as Additional file 2. (DOCX 17 kb)
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